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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. The adoption of a Constitution in August 2010 is a major milestone in Kenya’s tortuous 
reform journey. The Constitution is an important achievement for the coalition 
government and a significant step in the process of addressing the longstanding issues 
that triggered the post-2007 election violence. Under the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation agreement, the parties committed to finding lasting solutions to many 
problems by fast tracking constitutional and institutional reforms and taking measures 
to address long standing issues to prevent a recurrence of violence.   
2. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the reforms from 2008. This 
is the third review report for the year 2011. It is also the third review report under the 
new Constitution. Previous reports covering the period between December 2008 and 
June 2011 can be found at www.dialoguekenya.org.  
3. This report covers the July to September 2011 period. It focuses on three broad and 
interrelated areas: progress in implementation of the Constitution; electoral reforms 
and preparedness for the next General Election; and the legacy of post-election 
violence:, notably, continuation of the ICC intervention in the Kenyan situation, and 
the problem of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  
4. The report has utilised both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data derives 
from a national survey conducted in August and September 2011. Qualitative data is 
drawn from interviews with key informants from government ministries, humanitarian 
organisations, civil society organisations, the media and the public.  Secondary sources 
have also been reviewed for additional information.  
FINDINGS  
Implementation of the New Constitution 
5. The process of implementation of the constitution is on track. The necessary legal and 
institutional framework for implementation is in place. But there are no specific 
policies to anchor the laws that have been enacted. Similarly, the findings show that 
new institutions have capacity challenges particularly because some of them are being 
established afresh. Thus, building the capacity for these institutions and formulating 
coherent policies to guide implementation of laws remains an important and urgent 
task. Without a supportive policy framework, hurdles can emerge to constrain 
enforcement of these laws. Gaps in the law can be exploited to reverse the gains and 
achievements made so far.  
6. Parliament met the deadline to pass all Bills listed in Schedule 5 of the Constitution, 
which outlines the timelines within which laws to implement the Constitution should 
be passed. Similarly, all institutions that should have been put in place within the first 
year have been established and mandated to undertake actions to transit the country 
from the old order to a new one. Notwithstanding the fact that Parliament met a crucial 
deadline, the findings reveal a hurried process of passing the Bills. Parliament passed 
15 Bills within the last month of the deadline, yet only 11 Bills had been passed within a 
period of 11 months. The Bills were hurriedly debated and rushed through Parliament 
with a view to meeting the deadline. The Bills should have been debated earlier but 
vested interests, lethargy, and poor coordination between and among various actors, 
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delayed the process of drafting. 
7. The rushed manner in which the Bills were passed has raised concerns over quality and 
the extent to which various institutions are coordinating on their drafting. The extent 
and nature of public participation in the development of some of the Bills has also been 
raised as a concern. Another important finding is that even the Commission for the 
Implementation of the Constitution complained about the Executive by-passing it in 
drafting and publishing some of the Bills.  
8. About half of Kenyans are happy with the progress in implementing the Constitution. 
The general view that the new Constitution presents an opportunity for change in the 
style of managing public affairs has sustained confidence in the implementation 
process. Indeed, there is no significant relationship between the regions/people who 
voted to reject the Constitution at the referendum and extent of satisfaction with 
progress in implementation.  
9. The Constitution implementation process is experiencing a number of challenges. Not 
all ministries and departments from which some of the Bills originate have the capacity 
to develop quality laws. Those with capacity are overstretched, particularly because 
there are many Bills being drafted at the same time. Also, there are some actors that 
are not effectively coordinating with others in drafting Bills. Sometimes, differences 
have emerged at the finalisation stage. Some of these differences are attributable to 
narrow and short-term interests of some actors. Others are the result of extreme 
positions embedded in how some people are interpreting the Constitution. The divide 
in debates where some take radically conservative or extremist positions on a 
particular issue will continue to constrain implementation.  
10. The Judiciary has made the most significant progress in terms of transformative 
reforms thus far. Reforms in the Judiciary are seen as the biggest change the country 
has seen after the promulgation of the new Constitution. The Judiciary has set high 
standards for institutional reforms and rejuvenated public confidence in the sector.  
The transparent process through which judicial officers were appointed and the high 
integrity standards demanded of applicants to the Judiciary are responsible for this 
shift in perceptions about the institution.  
 
11. Many are confident that the Judiciary is taking the country in the right direction. This 
finding alone is enough evidence to underline the need to recruit for positions through 
transparent and competitive processes rather than horse-trading. Importantly, the 
improvement in perception of the Judiciary must be matched with visible results and 
achievements in line with people’s expectations in order for the level of satisfaction to 
be sustained. 
 
 Electoral Reforms and Preparedness for Elections 
12. Several laws have been enacted to improve the electoral process. A close review of the 
laws passed to support the electoral process reveals that, in some cases, short-term 
interests informed the decisions taken. For instance, the Political Parties Bill was 
introduced to streamline operations of political parties, instil political party discipline, 
provide guidelines on party loyalty and arrest the ‘party hopping’ that normally 
characterise election periods, when candidates switch to multiple parties in search of 
nomination. The Bill was amended to exclude strict control over, among others, party 
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hopping and formation of alliances. The enacted law, nonetheless, contains important 
provisions to streamline political party operations as provided for under Article 91 of 
the Constitution.  
 
13. The process to establish an Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) 
has begun in earnest. This is an important turning point in the journey from the post-
election violence. Some political leaders have expressed dissatisfaction with the list of 
short-listed applicants implying that they had preferences or that they were keen to 
have certain people in the new body. But politicisation of the process of establishing 
this new body will lay a foundation for future conflicts over decisions on election issues. 
 
14. An important aspect of preparations for the election is the institutional capacity of the 
body that will manage the elections. It is true that laws are important. But laws on their 
own without the agency to enforce and impose sanctions on those who breach them 
mean little, especially in a country where electoral violence, because of impunity, 
appears to have transformed into a culture. Giving the new body adequate powers to 
punish those who breach the law is important.  
 
15. Important also with regard to preparedness is to recognise that it is possible to go for 
an election on a particular date only to realise that the country is not politically and 
institutionally – or even technically – prepared to conduct the election. Thus the 
debate on the date should be accompanied by a discussion on technical, legal, political 
and institutional preparedness. 
The Legacy of Post-Election Violence 
16. The ICC process with regard to the Kenyan case has entered a new phase: the six 
suspects have been to The Hague for confirmation of charges hearings. After 
diplomatic efforts to secure a deferral failed, the government lodged an unsuccessful 
admissibility challenge in April 2011, and appealed the decision of the court, when it 
was rejected at the first instance. However, the Appeals Chamber observed that the 
government had not demonstrated any evidence of local investigations. The two parties 
in the coalition appear not to have a coherent approach to the ICC; there are those in 
favour and those keen to defer or even halt the intervention. 
17. Public opinion also shows that over half of the people believe the government lacks the 
will to investigate or prosecute suspected perpetrators of the post-election violence. At 
least 58 per cent believe the government cannot conduct local investigations. This 
suggests that public confidence in the government’s ability to fight impunity remains 
low. It also suggests that impunity, as an underlying cause of the post-election violence, 
has not been addressed. Nonetheless, the continued lack of a coherent policy position 
on the ICC and impunity means sectarian interests continue to dominate and direct 
government actions. Overtures to protect political careers rather than articulate and 
pursue a coherent government policy on holding people accountable appear to 
dominate this legacy of post-election violence.   
18. Public support for the ICC has remained high. Up to 65 per cent of Kenyans are happy 
that the ICC is pursuing the six suspects of post-election violence. A similarly high 
number of people, 64 per cent, trust that the ICC can effectively protect witnesses. This 
suggests that trust in public institutions and their ability to address PEV remains low. 
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There are very high expectations for the ICC to deliver justice to victims.   
19. Although the ICC is designed to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility, 
persisting impunity for low and middle-level perpetrators continues to pose a threat 
to future stability: Past review reports have shown that a majority of Kenyans believe 
investigations by the ICC will not trigger violence. The perception that the ICC is for 
‘big people’ may in fact harden impunity among the low-level perpetrators unless a 
local deterrent mechanism is put in place. However, the debate on domestic 
accountability for international crimes appears to have subsided with the continuing 
confirmation of hearings of charges at the ICC.   
Conclusions 
20. This review acknowledges that critical laws have been passed. A critical legal and 
institutional framework for implementation has been put in place. But some of these 
institutions lack the capacity to help consolidate gains and achievements thus far. 
Others are not anchored on a clear policy framework to guide implementation. There is 
thus need to begin building the capacity of institutions as well as developing clear and 
coherent policies to support their work.  
 
21. Implementation of the Constitution is at a critical point; the next General Election will 
take the country through a democratic transition if the polls are well and effectively 
managed. But failure to manage the electoral process or failure to prevent partisan 
political considerations from influencing decisions about the electoral process – 
including the date when elections are held -- could fail the country yet again.  
 
22. Although no themes have emerged to define the platform on which the campaigns for 
the next General Election will be contested, several questions are competing for 
attention. These include effective implementation of the Constitution; fighting 
impunity and seeking accountability; and establishment of a new morally driven 
leadership.  
 
23. The absence of appropriate and responsive themes thus far is leading to a situation 
where the main theme and the platform for the next General Elections is likely to be 
the issue of the ICC and ethnicity. This will derail the implementation of the 
Constitution, reverse the gains made, and result in continued impunity and recurrence 
of electoral violence. 
 
24. Thus the next election could emerge as a contest pitting reform forces against anti-
reform actors. The election will determine whether or not the promise of the new 
Constitution becomes a reality. For this reason, it is important to begin building a 
platform of effective implementation of the Constitution.  
 
25. The new electoral body could midwife a democratic dispensation or fail the country 
altogether. Failure to effectively and efficiently manage the electoral process would 
certainly fail the country. It is important, therefore, for attention to be paid to 
‘institutional preparedness’. It is possible to determine that an election should be held 
on a particular date only to realise that the country is not politically and institutionally 
– or even technically – prepared to conduct the election. Whatever date the country 
opts for, legal, political and institutional preparations must be finalised in advance. 
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26. The legacy of the post-election violence continues to manifest itself in two important 
ways: the ICC intervention and the IDPs problem. Although the ICC has intervened and 
the confirmation of charges hearings is going on, the country must begin thinking 
about domestic accountability. The country must establish mechanisms to hold lower 
and middle level and other perpetrators accountable. Public awareness on 
complementarity – awareness of  domestic accountability for international crimes -- 
should be built in earnest and before the next elections. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. This is the review report on implementation of reforms in Kenya for the third quarter 
of 2011. It focuses on implementation of the constitution and other reforms agreed 
during the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) mediation process in 
2008 under the African Union’s (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities led by Mr 
Kofi Annan. Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org.  
2. This report covers the July to September 2011 period and is based on both primary and 
secondary sources of data. Quantitative data was collected through a national survey 
comprising 2o00 respondents selected through multi-stage cluster sampling using 
population proportionate to size, with the 2010 National Census data as the sampling 
frame. On the other hand, qualitative data was obtained through interviews with key 
informants drawn from government ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil 
society organisations, the media and the public.  Secondary information was obtained 
by reviewing reports and documents by the government, development agencies, the 
media and non-governmental organisations 
3. The report is in five main parts that examine the main political developments in Kenya 
during the period under review. The main emphasis in all the parts is the 
implementation of the new Constitution. Thus the report is organised as follows: 
a. Part I: Introduction and socio-economic context 
b. Part II: Progress toward implementing the new Constitution 
c. Part III: Electoral reforms and preparedness for the next General 
Election 
d. Part IV: The legacy of Post-Election Violence: the ICC and IDPs 
e. Part V: Conclusion 
The Social Economic Context 
4. The 2011 second quarterly report noted that many Kenyans identified the high cost of 
living and inflation in general, as the single most serious problem facing the country. 
There were no significant changes in this perception during the period under review. 
When asked, ‘in your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today’, as 
many as 76 per cent of survey respondents cited the high cost of living, while 10 per 
cent and seven per cent mentioned unemployment and corruption, respectively, as the 
most serious problems. Another five per cent cited poor leadership as a serious 
problem. 
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Figure 1: In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today? 
76%
10%
5%
7%
1%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
High cost of living
Lack of employment
Poor leadership
Corruption
Tribalism
In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today? 
(by Total)
 
5. There are variations in regional perceptions, however. In North Eastern region, only 52 
per cent or about half of the respondents in the area said the high cost of living was the 
most serious problem. Another 20 per cent and 13 per cent identified unemployment 
and corruption, respectively, as the main challenges.  In all the other regions, over 67 
per cent identified the high cost of living as the main challenge. Importantly, more 
women (83 per cent) than men (69 per cent) think the cost of living is the main 
challenge. 
Figure 2: In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing Kenya today? (By region 
and gender) 
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6. The high cost of living, combined with high unemployment rates, especially among the 
youth, have the potential to roll back the political, social and economic gains that the 
country has made since the early 2008 post-election period.  
 
7. There are no significant changes in how people feel about safety. When asked about 
safety now compared to just after the 2007 General Election, 53 per cent reported that 
they felt safer while 34 per cent said they felt less safe.  
 
Figure 3: Thinking of your safety now compared to just after the 2007 General Election, do 
you feel safer, less safe, or about the same? 
53%
34%
12%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Safer
Less safe
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Thinking of your safety now compared to just after the 2007 general 
elections, do you feel safer, less safe, or about the same? (by Total)
 
 
8. The June 2011 report noted that the high cost of living and unemployment would 
compound Kenya’s socio-political fault lines or converge with other fault lines to 
exacerbate conflicts. As shown later in this report, there is public anxiety over the next 
General Election and the outcome of the ICC confirmation of charges hearings. These 
two issues are creating new fault lines. The most likely outcome of these dynamics is 
slowed economic growth and, most importantly, reforms will suffer. There will be slow 
and incomplete implementation of critical reforms.  
9. The economy has shown growth since the post-election violence in early 2008. 
Although economic growth suddenly slumped from about seven per cent in 2007 to 
about 1.5 per cent in 2008 due to post-election violence, it had showed remarkable 
recovery by end of 2010 when it grew by 5.6 per cent. However, from mid-2011, there is 
notable stress from a high inflation rate and the depreciation of the Kenya Shilling 
against international currencies. This is negatively impacting on the economy. The 
consequences of high inflation can feed into existing fault lines and trigger new 
challenges, especially during an election year. 
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Figure 4: Inflation in Kenya (2010 to 2011) 
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10. Economic growth in Kenya is not stable. The growth rapidly drops during an election 
period. Important sectors, such as agriculture, on which many people depend, tend to 
under-perform during the elections period particularly because of political anxieties in 
the Rift Valley, one of the major agricultural regions of the country. 
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Figure 5: Kenya’s electoral cycle and trends in economic growth 
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Figure 6: Kenya’s electoral cycle and trends in agricultural growth 
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11. The two figures clearly show that growth in agriculture and the economy in general 
slumps to their lowest during an election year. Recovery begins almost immediately 
after an election but is not sustained for long before campaigns for another electoral 
cycle begin.  This has been the trend for the past two decades – all election years are 
marked by a rapid decline in agricultural production and the economy in general. 
There are currently no signs that the next General Election will be different. 
12. The country is undergoing a transition from the old order to a new one with the change 
in the Constitution. People are anxious about this transition because the post-election 
violence remains an important political issue in Kenya today. Related to this are 
anxieties around youth unemployment and how it is expressing itself. Recent times 
have witnessed youth fascination with illicit activities, their restive nature, and 
admiration of individuals with little respect for the rule of law. Whatever the case, 
youth unemployment and cost of living are likely to remain high as the country 
approaches the next general election. Engagement with these two problems is critical 
before the campaigns for the next general election intensify. 
13. Kenyans want the coalition government to tackle the high cost of living. When asked 
what the coalition can do to work as one government, 38 per cent of the respondents 
said they wanted it to concentrate on lowering the cost of living. Another 24 per cent 
said they want the Principals to consult  and work together. Kenyans are concerned 
about the lack of unity among leaders and want the government to pay more attention 
to social service delivery. 
Figure 7: What one thing can the coalition government do to work better? 
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14. Most people like ‘nothing’ about the coalition government: There is disilusionment 
with the coalition, with 30 per cent of the respondents saying they like ‘nothing’ about 
the coalition government. Another 21 per cent said they like the fact that the coalition 
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brought peace and reconciliation after the 2008 violence. 
 
Figure 8: What do you like most about the coalition government? 
 
15. High cost of living is a source of concern: Up to 39 per cent of respondents said they 
dislike the coalition government because of the high cost of living. They think the 
government is disconnected from the concerns of ordinary citizens. For instance, there 
is a palpable disenchantment that it has not done enough to lower food prices. 
 
Figure 9: What do you dislike most about the coalition government? 
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Conclusion 
16. Rising inflation and the depreciation of the shilling constitute major economic 
challenges during the period under review. These problems will negatively impact on 
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implementation of reforms and may slow down growth not only in agriculture but also 
in other important sectors of the economy. Early campaigns for the next General 
Election will no doubt exacerbate this trend. Strong electoral laws and a strong culture 
of enforcement must be underlined as critical measures to address this enormous 
challenge. 
17. These problems will add to the fault lines around which conflict in Kenya build. Indeed, 
a slow economic growth, combined with a rising unemployment and generally huge 
income inequalities constitute a combustible mix that can explode if there is no strong 
commitment to cushion the poor, adhere to the rule of law and demonstrate political 
resolve to end impunity in all its forms and at all levels of the society. 
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2. PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTION  
 
Introduction 
18. The promulgation of the new Constitution in August 2010 was the biggest milestone in 
Kenya’s reform journey of over 20 years. Indeed, it is the most important achievement 
of the coalition government. The new Constitution raised public optimism for a new 
political culture by introducing national values and principles of governance to guide 
state-society relations and public service. It has filled a major lacuna that had long 
prevented the realisation of fundamental legal and institutional reforms. The 
governance architecture has also changed. There are new centres of power at the local 
level away from the centre. 
 
19. The Constitution has attempted to cure the problem of how power is exercised by 
firming up checks and balances on presidential powers but has not cured the 
shortcomings of Kenya’s ‘First-Past-The-Post’ electoral system. The politics of  the 
‘winner-take-all’ is still embedded in the electoral system and its consequences are 
likely radiate through the newly established institutions of governance.  
 
20. This notwithstanding, the Constitution has provided the much-needed environment for 
implementing reforms envisaged under Agenda 4 of the National Accord, seen as 
critical for preventing the recurrence of violence. This section of the report discusses 
progress in implementing the Constitution. It focuses on Bills that had to be passed, 
institutional reforms, and challenges that the implementation process has encountered 
over the past three months. 
The Constitution Implementation Process 
21. Constitutional implementation is on course: Considerable progress has been made in 
passing laws and setting up new institutions in accordance with the Constitution. By 
the end of August 2011, one year after the promulgation of the Constitution, Parliament 
had passed all the critical Bills in line with the deadline in Schedule 5 –the Constitution 
implementation timeline -- within a year of the promulgation. The period under review 
also witnessed initiation of several reforms. Transformation of the Judiciary began in 
earnest: a new Chief Justice, a deputy Chief Justice and Registrar of High Court were 
competitively hired. The Supreme Court was also established after the swearing in of 
Judges appointed to sit in it. Judges of the High Court were also recruited. 
 
22. Other important appointments during the period include that of a new Attorney 
General, the Auditor-General, and Controller of Budget. The process of setting up the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission is under way, and the vetting of 
Judges and Magistrates is due to commence soon. 
 
23. Hurrying the passage of Bills and fencing off public scrutiny attenuated the 
confidence in progress made: While it is commendable that Parliament met the 27 
August deadline for the passage of certain laws, it is also important to pause and reflect 
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on the journey towards their implementation. Within a period of about one week, 
Parliament passed 15 Bills. Before that, and for close to 11 months, Parliament had 
passed only 11 Bills since the promulgation of the Constitution.  
 
24. The manner in which the bulk of pending Bills were rushed through debate and 
approved in Parliament has raised public concern over their quality, the reasons 
behind the delay, and the sudden haste with which they were processed. As of 20 
August 2011, Parliament had passed only six of the 24 Bills required in the first one 
year after the promulation. Notwithstanding the blame game on who was responsible 
for the delays, it is important to underline that old habits and vested interests 
combined to undermine the momentum of developing and passing Bills at different 
stages. This resulted in a situation where ‘everyone was blaming everyone’ for failing to 
fast-track the Bills. Some observers are even suspicious that the delays were a strategy 
to avoid public scrutiny of the Bills, allowing vested interests to sneak weak or 
controversial legislation through.2  
 
25. In the end, even the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) 
complained about being bypassed in the process of reviewing some of the laws. To the 
CIC, some of the Bills touching on devolution, including the Contingencies and County 
Emergencies Funds Bill and the National Government Loans Guarantee Bill, were 
passed without requisite scrutiny by the CIC or the public. Consequently, the CIC has 
gone to court to obtain orders preventing their debate and enactment. Such legal 
challenges, which could have been avoided, are a significant reminder of the resilience 
of vested interests and resistance to change, and this calls for public vigilance. 
 
26. Nearly a half of Kenyans are satisfied with the progress of constitution 
implementation: The perception that the new Constitution indeed presents an 
opportunity for changing the style in which public affairs are managed has sustained 
public confidence in the implementation process. More people are satisfied with the 
progress in implementation than  in the last quarter. When asked, ‘How satisfied or 
dissatisfied are you with the progress of implementation of the new Constitution?’ 52 
per cent of respondents said they are satisfied. Only 12 per cent said they are not 
satisfied at all.  
 
                                                 
2Interview with a former member of the Committee of Experts  
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Figure 10: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the progress of implementation of new 
Constitution? (Total) 
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27. People in some regions are relatively more satisfied with progress in implementing 
the Constitution than others: A regional analysis of the data shows that some regions, 
including some of those that supported the passing of the Constitution, are dissatisfied 
with progress in implementation. For instance, 53 per cent of respondents in Coast 
region, 43 per cent in the Rift Valley and 42 per cent in Nairobi are not satisfied.  
 
Table 1: Regional variations in satisfaction with progress in Constitution 
implementation 
  
 
Central Coast Eastern Nairobi 
North 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley 
Western 
Satisfied 
61% 31% 59% 51% 72% 55% 43% 61% 
Not Satisfied 
32% 53% 32% 42% 20% 33% 43% 30% 
DK/RTA 
7% 16% 8% 6% 8% 13% 13% 9% 
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Figure 11: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the progress of implementation of new 
Constitution? (By region) 
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28. There is no relationship between how people in various regions voted at the 
referendum and their satisfaction with the progress of Constitution implementation: 
Satisfaction with progress in implementation is high even in areas that voted against 
the document at the referendum in August 2010. Up to 43 per cent of respondents in 
Rift Valley, for instance, are satisfied with implementation (only 34 per cent voted 
against the draft at the referendum). Important is that regions that approved the 
Constitution in large numbers at the referendum are also the same ones that are 
satisfied with its implementation. For instance, 72 per cent of respondents in North 
Eastern Kenya are satisfied with progress: 96 per cent of voters in the region supported 
the document at referendum. Generally, there is no significant relationship between 
how people voted and how they are judging implementation.  
 
29. People are satisfied with progress on the Constitution because they see important 
changes: The unprecedentedly transparent method of recruiting public officers, the 
high integrity and accountability standards required of applicants, the consideration of 
marginalised groups, and opening up of the process to the public have combined to 
inspire confidence in the implementation process.  To some, there is a departure from 
the old culture of recruitment into the public service. Asked whether they have 
observed any changes since the adoption of the new Constitution, 53 per cent of survey 
respondents answered in the affirmative.  
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Figure 12: Have you observed any change in the country since the adoption of the new 
Constitution? 
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30. People across all the regions have noticed changes brought by the Constitution. 
Nairobi, with 65 per cent affirmative answers among respondents, leads in affirming 
these of changes. North Eastern follows at 60 per cent.  
 
Figure 13: Have you observed any change in the country since the adoption of the new 
Constitution? 
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31. The process of vetting state officials is the most notable change after the adoption of 
the new Constitution: When asked the specific changes they have seen, 28 per cent of 
respondents cited public vetting of officials; 19 per cent say they have seen changes in 
the Judiciary. The judicial and prosecution office holders were the first to be vetted and 
recruited under the new Constitution. 
 
Figure 14: If Yes (observed any change), what is the change? Total 
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32. The process of vetting and recruiting public officers governed by the values of the new 
Constitution has set high standards for institutional reforms and earned public 
approval. Institutions that have not recruited using open and transparent procedures, 
such as the police, continue to receive public criticism. The Judiciary has experienced 
the most farreaching reforms in this respect. And in line with this transformation, the 
Judiciary has received Ksh11 billion to support reforms. This is possibly the largest 
amount of money ever to have been allocated to the Judiciary.  
 
33. The changes have helped spur public confidence in the Judiciary: The manner of 
hiring Judges, together with other changes in the Judiciary has been competitive, 
transparent and open to public scrutiny. Because of this, reforms in the Judiciary have 
been the most visible within government organs. The Judiciary demonstrates the most 
enduring signs of change. The changes have helped to spur public confidence in the 
Judiciary. Thus, when asked about satisfaction with the performance of public 
institutions, 54 per cent of respondents said they were satisfied with the Judiciary 
while only 36 per cent said they were satisfied with the performance of the police. This 
is an important finding given that people have perceived the Judiciary poorly: in 
September 2009, only 28 per cent said they were satisfied with the performance of the 
Judiciary. This is, therefore, a remarkable improvement in the people’s confidence in 
the Judiciary. 
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34. There is no policy on public participation: Some observers have noted that the vetting 
of those applying for jobs in the government sector has the potential for improving 
confidence in these institutions if there were a policy to guide public participation. 
They are concerned that there is no information on how the short-listing of candidates 
for interviews is carried out.  They fear that ‘this can be an avenue for horse trading 
since the interviewing panel does not disclose how the candidates were judged; the 
transparency is incomplete.’3  
 
35. There is no coherent framework to guide the vetting of public appointments but 
Chapter Six stands out as the main framework: Indeed, the process of vetting public 
appointments is not anchored on any policy or legal framework. Each interviewing 
body sets its own operating rules. Aggrieved applicants have no avenue for complaint 
or redress. Ensuring greater transparency through the selection process will enhance 
public trust and confidence and assure applicants that merit rather than political 
influence is the determining criterion.  
 
36. People think that not everyone is being consulted in making of laws: During the 
survey, respondents were asked about how much they had participated in the making 
of the new laws or whether they knew anyone who had been consulted. A whopping 87 
per cent of respondents said they had not attended any meeting to discuss the making 
of new laws while 75 per cent said they did not know anyone who had attended any 
discussion on the making of laws. However, people believe the government is 
consulting people – at least 37 per cent think so. Another 43 per cent think that 
people’s opinions are reflected in these laws. Clearly, people have good faith in the 
process of Constitutional implementation. They are circumspect about the values of the 
new law. 
 
Table 2: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
regarding the making of laws under the new Constitution? 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the making of 
laws under the new constitution? 
  Agree Disagree DK NR/RTA 
I have attended discussions/meeting on making new 
laws 
12% 87% 1% 0% 
I know someone who has attended 
discussions/meeting on making some of the new laws 
21% 75% 3% 1% 
The government is consulting people in making new 
laws 
37% 47% 14% 1% 
People’s opinions are reflected in the new laws 43% 42% 14% 1% 
 
These findings clearly show a need for standards to determine when ‘public participation’ 
has taken place. Some processes mention ‘stakeholder review’ but it is not clear who 
stakeholders are, and if they adequately represent the public. Lack of clarity on ‘when 
                                                 
3 Interview with a lawyer, 29 August 2011 
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public participation starts or ends’4 and the discretion of individual within institutions to 
involve the public can create elitism and lead to the public’s exclusion. A framework on 
public participation in the making of laws and in the implementation of the Constitution in 
general should be formulated urgently. 
 
37. The Constitution is influencing people to be progressive: there are many people 
supportive of additional seats to address gender equity: Asked whether they would 
support efforts to reserve some seats for women, as many as 64 per cent of respondents 
answered in the affirmative. Nyanza, Central and Eastern regions have the highest 
approval of this proposal. 
 
Figure 15: Would you support a proposal to reserve some parliamentary constituencies for 
women candidates to ensure the next Parliament has at least 1/3 women? 
Yes
64%
No
32%
DK
4%
Would you support a proposal to reserve some parliamentary 
constituencies for women candidates to ensure the next parliament has 
at least 1/3 women? (by Total)
 
 
                                                 
4
 Interview with a member of the CIOC, August 2011 
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Table 3: Would you support a proposal to reserve some parliamentary constituencies for 
women candidates to ensure the next Parliament has at least 1/3 women? 
 
Figure 16: Would you support a proposal to reserve some parliamentary constituencies for 
women to ensure 1/3 of women in next Parliament? (By region) 
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38. These responses generally suggest that people are supportive of attempts to address the 
problem of equity. Of course, these regional variations require deeper analysis to distil 
both the fears of gender equity and the aspirations of different communities. The point 
to note, however, is that people are evolving progressive attitudes in line with the spirit 
of the Constitution.  
 
39. However, there is also a need for greater vigilance on the social-cultural hurdles that 
undermine gender equity in elective posts. The grip of patriarchy on many societies is 
yet to weaken. Up to 50 per cent of the respondents in North Eastern, 39 per cent in 
  
Total Central Coast Eastern Nairobi 
North 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley 
Western 
Yes 64% 71% 61% 69% 59% 50% 75% 59% 62% 
No 32% 27% 27% 28% 39% 50% 20% 37% 34% 
RTA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
DK 4% 1% 12% 3% 0% 0% 4% 3% 4% 
NR 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
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Nairobi, 37 per cent in the Rift Valley and 34 per cent in Western said they would not 
support measures to secure constituencies for women to achieve the constitutional 
threshold of representation. While this may reflect gendered perceptions of political 
leadership, it could also be a signal of the absence of strong women leaders offering 
themselves for such positions in these regions.  
Devolution 
40. Taskforce on devolved government has concluded its work: The taskforce on devolved 
government handed over its final report on 6 September 2011. The report contained 
recommendations and a draft Sessional Paper to guide the implementation of the 
devolved system of government. Parliament has passed three laws touching on 
devolved government -- the National Government Loans Guarantee Act, the 
Contingencies and County Emergency Funds Act and the Urban Areas and Cities Act. 
The Public Finance Bill and Transition to Devolved Government Bill are yet to be 
debated and passed. The legislative framework for founding and entrenching 
devolution is in place. But building capacities at the county level in preparation for the 
actual operation of the devolved governments is an issue that should be given priority 
consideration because failure to prepare for this could collapse the model on which an 
important pillar of the Constitution is based.  
 
41. Kenyans have very high expectations of the devolved government. As the last review 
report noted, a majority of Kenyans expect the devolved government to bring public 
services and resources closer to them and guarantee access to national resources 
through the devolved funds, thus cushioning them from marginalisation. Once in place, 
60 per cent of the respondents said they would want the counties to prioritise job 
creation. 
 
Figure 17: What two things would you like the county government to prioritise? 
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42. Notwithstanding the high expectations that people have of devolution, it is worth 
noting that the Ministry of Local Government/Taskforce on Devolution and the 
Ministry of Finance have been embroiled in controversies over issues of public finances 
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under the devolution governance structure. The disagreement has resulted in two 
parallel Public Finance Bills, one by each organ. These two institutions have failed to 
reach an agreement to present joint Bills for debate in Parliament. 
 
43. Conflict over the Devolution Bill signifies competing interests: Conflict over the 
Financial Management Bill signals a wider tension between viewpoints on devolution. 
They are part of the tension that was not concluded at the time of negotiation between 
the two main parties to the coalition government and before the referendum.5 The 
tension appears to demonstrate reluctance to give up centralised control of power and 
resource. This is causing fear of the unknown, uncertainty and personal insecurity on 
the part of those who have been serving under the centralised system.6 It is important 
to ensure that valid concerns are examined through the prism of the Constitution in 
order to arrive at solutions that address these concerns in line with the spirit and letter 
of the Constitution. Most importantly, resisting the basic tenets of devolution or 
adopting extreme positions not in consonance with the constitutional aspirations of the 
people undermine and negate the historic gains that the Constitution has provided. 
 
44. Commission for Revenue Allocation is not visible: The Commission for Revenue 
Allocation (CRA) has a critical role to play in the devolution process. Since its 
appointment in 2010, the activities of the CRA have remained largely unknown and 
invisible to the public. It has been argued that the Commission was formed without a 
legislative framework; that it was simply ‘carved out’ of the Constitution.7 In this 
respect, it lacks a law to guide its work. Nonetheless, the CRA Act was enacted in the 
period under review, on 28 August 2011. It is the Act that will operationalise and 
invigorate the Commission and make its activities more visible, particularly its critical 
role in the creation of counties and overall participation in the implementation of the 
Constitution. 
Police Reforms 
45. During this quarter, two police Bills were passed by Parliament and enacted – the 
National Police Service Act and the National Police Service Commission Act. The 
National Police Service Act is a critical law because it addresses many important 
elements of policing identified in both report by the Philip Ransley-led Taskforce on 
Police Reforms and the new Constitution. These include internal discipline, capacity, 
community policing, and the creation of the Kenya Police Service. It will also guide the 
recruitment of the Inspector General of Police, vetting of all police officers to determine 
whether they are going to continue serving.8 In addition, a policy on community 
policing has been finalised, and is expected to be devolved to the counties. 
  
46. Other reforms that have been effected include the implementation of a new training 
curriculum for the police, which emphasises, among others, the Bill of Rights and 
change of attitude of the police.9 It is expected that the curriculum will transform the 
                                                 
5 Interview with an official of the Taskforce on Devolution, 18 August 2011; remarks corroborated by an 
interview with an analyst from the civil society, 8 September 2011 
6 Interview with a former member of the Committee of Experts, 6 September 2011 
7‘How new laws were broken 18 times’ The Standard, 10 August 2011 
8 Interview with a civil society informant, 16 September 2011 
9 Remarks by a senior government official in a public meeting to discuss crime prevention strategies held on 12 
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work ethic in the police force. The length of police training has also been changed in 
line with the new curriculum -- professional/graduate police officers are now being 
trained for 21 months while lower cadre non-professional police will be trained for 15 
months. Initially, all police officers were trained for six months. 
 
47. The police service is also in the process of strengthening internal accountability 
systems, which will be boosted by the formation of an Independent Police Oversight 
Authority (IPOA).10 The oversight authority will ensure complaints against the police 
are handled efficiently. Bills on policing are being drafted by the Police Reforms 
Implementation Committee (PRIC), pending the establishment of the National Police 
Service Commission, which should facilitate the merging of the Regular and 
Administration Police into one National Police Service. The recruitment of the 
Inspector General is the function of the National Police Service Commission, which is 
yet to be established. The two Principals are yet to set up a selection panel to recruit 
Commissioners to the National Police Service Commission. An Inspector General will 
head the National Police Service once it is put in place. 
 
48. Most of the changes taking place within the police service are administrative. They are 
yet to address the capacity of the police to carry out its everyday policing work. As a 
senior official noted, ‘there is no point of training graduates if you will not give them 
the resources they need to do their job; a graduate will not walk to a crime scene 
because there is no vehicle; he/she will rarely get into a gun battle with criminals 
without a bullet-proof jacket.’11 There is a need thus for meaningful changes to build 
police capacity and renew public confidence in the institution. In fact, citizens have 
continuously said they are dissatisfied with the work of the police. Asked how satisfied 
they were with the performance of the police, 60 per cent of respondents said they were 
dissatisfied. At the same time, only 54 per cent said they were confident that the police 
could stop violence related to elections if it were to recur.  
Challenges to Implementation of the Constitution 
49. There are a number of challenges facing the implementation of the Constitution. Some 
of these are internal to the process of implementation while others are the result of the 
external political environment. This section identifies and discusses the factors that are 
of critical importance in challenging effective implementation. 
 
50. Drafting capacity: The Constitution has created opportunities for drafting of many 
laws, almost simultaneously. All government departments are in the process of 
originating crucial Bills. However, there are few agencies with the requisite capacity to 
draft quality Bills in good time. Because of this, there has been a tendency towards the 
late submission of Bills whose quality is, sometimes, wanting. This has overburdened 
some of the drafting departments and even turned the CIC into a drafting body. At the 
same time, it has resulted in drastic revision of some Bills so that the initial meaning 
and spirit is lost.  Indeed, there have been instances where several versions of the same 
Bill are submitted without clarity on which of the drafts is the final version for review. 
                                                                                                                                                     
August 2011 
10 ibid 
11 Interview with senior government official , Ministry of Internal Security, July 2011 
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51. Limited consultations, vested interests and competing viewpoints among 
stakeholders delayed finalisation of Bills: Differences between ministries and 
departments have shown up at the finalisation stage of some Bills. Some stakeholders 
also complain of limited or little involvement of the public by originating ministries. 
There are still those who argue that ministries were not coordinating work among 
themselves in drafting the Bills. Some of these differences emanate from self-interest, 
partisan considerations, and generally restrictive viewpoints. In fact, there is a 
tendency to have extreme positions on a single issue: there are those who tend to take 
extremely conservative positions and those who adopt equally radical views on the 
same issue. Bridging this divide is difficult and ends up causing delays in processing 
the Bills. 
 
52. Some of these differences – and extreme positions -- result from the grey areas and the 
contentious issues that remained unresolved at the time of negotiations before the 
referendum. How the numerically large groups will coexist and share resources with 
minorities under the devolved government was one such issue. The sticking points 
have returned to strain relations between and among stakeholders. It is possible that 
these consequences will be litigated: people who are unhappy with the Bills/Acts or feel 
that some amendments are not in line with the Constitution are likely to seek the 
intervention of the courts. This will further delay the process of implementation. 
 
53. Already some Acts of Parliament have been challenged in court. The Judges and 
Magistrates Vetting Board, which was formed after the passage of the Vetting and 
Magistrates Act 2011, has been stopped from starting work until a case in court is heard 
and determined.12 The applicant in the case argues that there are conflicts between the 
Vetting Act and the Constitution. The CIC has also gone to court to obtain orders 
preventing the debate and enactment of the National Government Loans Guarantee 
Bill and the Contingencies and County Emergency Funds Bill arguing that Cabinet, by 
passing the Bills without consulting the CIC, undermined the commission’s role as 
stipulated under the Constitution.13 The Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission Act, 2011, has also been challenged in court, with the applicant arguing 
that Parliament had acted in a discriminatory manner by passing a Bill that effectively 
sacked Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission members. Legal challenges, while likely to 
delay the process, are in this regard a positive indicator of public vigilance. 
 
54. Citizens are aware that divisions among politicians are delaying the implementation 
of the Constitution: Kenyans are sensitive to these challenges. They are also concerned 
about how political considerations influence voting patterns in Parliament when a Bill 
is debated. Indeed, pressure within Parliament has emerged as a significant challenge 
to policy implementation. Strategies to lobby votes to support or defeat Bills -- often 
driven by who has sponsored the Bill rather than its content and merit -- have tended 
to alienate Parliament from the people. Asked what difficulties they see in the 
implementation process, many respondents, 65 percent, cited divisions among 
politicians the single most important difficulty. Another 19 per cent observed that the 
                                                 
12 ‘Suit against top judges dismissed’ Daily Nation, 25 August 2011 
13 Article 261(4) of the Constitution and Section 14 of the 6th Schedule; see also ‘CIC, House to Lock Horns Over 
Bills’, The Standard, 26 August 2011 
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campaigns for an earlier election are a challenge. 
 
Figure 18: What difficulties, if any, do you see in the implementation of the new 
Constitution? 
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55. There is no coherent leadership of the Constitution implementation process. 
Implementing agencies including the CIC, CIOC and the Ministry of Justice, National 
Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs as well as other ministries and stakeholders have 
been involved in a blame game over delays encountered in the development of the Bills. 
The apparent lack of clarity about their respective roles, working relationships or 
coordination arrangements has created the impression that competing centres of 
decision-making are constraining the implementation process. These divisions portray 
the constitution implementing agencies as divided and lacking a clear overall strategy 
for operationalising the Constitution. Lack of clear leadership and ownership of the 
implementation process is likely to create oversight gaps, allowing non-reformers to 
sneak into law claw-back clauses to undermine the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution.14 
 
56. Lack of conflict mediation structures: Lack of synergy and coherence between the 
implementing institutions and differences of opinion on the implementation process 
has been played out in the media, highlighting the absence of an arbitration 
mechanism. The conflicts escalate because there is no mechanism to arbitrate when 
disagreements occur. While the CIOC and the Principals have tried to mediate -- for 
example, between the Taskforce on Devolved Government and Treasury -- their efforts 
were ad hoc and came at a time when extremists had entrenched their positions. This 
                                                 
14 Remarks in a public forum to mark one year since the passage of the Constitution, 4 August 2011 
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certainly raises a need for deliberate efforts to create synergy between the Constitution 
implementation organs so as to reduce conflicts of this nature.  
 
57. Civic education is lacking: Civic education does not appear to have intensified after the 
referendum. This is unfortunate, considering 93 per cent of respondents said they 
know very little or nothing at all about the Constitution. It appears as though the pre-
referendum campaigns focused on contentious issues. The messages were often 
politically-laden. 
 
Figure 19: How much would you say you know about the new Constitution? 
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58. Lack of awareness about provisions of the Constitution suggests the public cannot 
engage meaningfully with the Constitution implementation process. Civic education is, 
therefore, urgently needed -- especially on issues around devolution and voter 
education in readiness for the next General Election. It is encouraging that the 
Taskforce on Devolved Government has drafted a civic education programme on 
devolution aimed at mitigating this concern. But civic education need not wait till the 
demarcation of county wards and constituencies or the campaign period; it needs to 
start early.  
 
59. Need to build constitutionalism: The Constitution is a living document that needs to 
evolve through generations. However, the implementation process has been made to 
appear like a project with timed deliverables: ‘It has not been made into a new way of 
life. But the culture of constitutionalism can be galvanised by enforcement of the laws 
and respect for the values and principles and spirit of the Constitution, not just ticking 
off new Bills passed.’15 Making it a living document requires changing the way people 
                                                 
15 Interview with a policy analyst, 4 August 2011 
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relate, their social attitudes and moving towards social justice. It means placing an 
emphasis on implementation should transcend discussion on the number of laws 
passed to focus on the new values brought about by the Constitution. Passing Bills 
solely to fulfill the stipulated guidelines presents the risk of having a constitution 
without constitutionalism.  
 
60. Self-preservation motives present a great challenge to change under the new 
Constitution. Persons or groups likely to be adversely affected by change under the new 
Constitution are resisting change. The Political Parties and Elections Bills provided 
good examples in this respect. MPs introduced amendments that serve to promote 
their personal interests. Similar self-preservation efforts manifest in government 
bureaucracy where the formulation of some of Bills appears aimed at retaining the 
status quo. Legislative manouvres to create laws skewed in favour of sectarian interests 
could continue to weaken institutions and erode the gains made under the 
Constitution.  
 
61. Political and ethnic divisions within parties tend to be reflected in the coalition 
government. In effect, there is a thin line between political party positions and the 
position of the party’s leadership on a government policy. The result is continued weak 
government institutions because politicians in government protect and advance their 
party interests rather than articulate and protect government policy. The lack of 
cohesion within the government, and the image of ‘two-governments-in-one’ often spill 
over into the implementation process, especially at the time of passing Bills in 
Parliament.16 Absence of an effective conflict resolution mechanism within the coalition 
is certainly responsible for this. The Permanent Committee on the Management of the 
Affairs of the Coalition is ineffective and rarely meets. 
62. Lack of cohesion in the coalition is not necessarily bad – after all: Kenyans are 
unhappy about the recurrent political wrangles in the coalition government, but at the 
same time, some recognise such wrangling as having had positive results. They note 
that lack of cohesion compelled the Executive to desist from making unilateral 
decisions without due regard for the law. Appointments are negotiated and agreed 
upon; they are not made by one party alone.  To some, ‘the variation of opinion is a 
good thing if it is done in good faith.’17 The challenge, however, is how to manage 
differences and channel them to the greater good of the nation.  
63. Lack of reform champions in Parliament: Parliament does not seem to have any 
champions who are driving the Constitution implementation agenda. There is no solid 
block of parliamentarians who seem committed to working together.18 The 
implementation process has been left to individual ministers to push the several pieces 
of legislation. Emphasis is not on the content of the new laws. Rather, it is on simply 
getting them passed. Once Bills are brought to Parliament, politicians support or 
amend them on the basis of personal, parochial,  and ethnic considerations, which may 
significantly water down the value and weight of such laws.19 
64. Government actions tend to contradict the spirit of the law: During the period under 
                                                 
16 Interview with a member of the CIOC, August 2011 
17 Interview with a former member of the Committee of Experts, 6 September 2011 
18 Interview with a former member of the Committee of Experts, 6 September 2011 
19 Interview with an MP, August 2011 
35  
  
 
review, the two Principals undertook a Cabinet shuffle that saw some of the people who 
had been suspended from office over corruption allegations reinstated without making 
public information on whether they had been cleared by the Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission (KACC). A few weeks later, MPs voted to disband KACC, thus 
compromising continuity in the operations of KACC and blocking an effective 
transition to the new Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.  These are contradictory 
actions, given that the Constitution seeks to build a strong culture of fighting 
corruption and all forms of impunity.  
65. Ethnic undertones threatening the image of new institutions: While the Constitution 
outlines modalities for hiring State officers – including public participation -- 
applicants are still seen through ethnic lenses. There are intense discussions on the 
ethnic identity of applicants rather than on their quality and merit. While this is meant 
to ensure respect for ‘diversity’, the debates on ethnicity have the potential to denigrate 
the aspirations of the Constitution. This risks undermining the credibility of the new 
institutions. It also shows that Kenyans are yet to embrace the spirit of nationhood. 
Some tend to view appointments as motivated by ethnic considerations.20 Interestingly, 
this argument of tribalism is usually raised whenever a nominee is from the President’s 
or Prime Minister’s ethnic community. While this is an important form of vigilance, the 
manner in which the debate is presented can derail the appointments process.  
66. Polarisation resulting from these disputes has rapidly shifted the focus of debate away 
from constitutionalism to consolidation of ethnic interests. Notably, there is limited or 
no public debate on how appointments will improve service delivery. This debate has 
glossed over these issues, yet they are very critical for laying the foundation for radical 
reforms envisaged under the new Constitution. 
67. Competing interpretations of the Constitution: The process leading to the passage of 
Bills for the establishment of the Gender Commission, the Human Rights Commission 
and the Office of the Ombudsman was fraught with controversy. Contestation stemmed 
from multiple interpretations of Article 59 and Article 59(4) of the Constitution, on 
whether to have one robust national human rights institution (NHRI) or several. Some 
favoured a ‘one-stop shop’ for all human rights issues. On the other hand, there were 
those in favour of an independent Gender Commission. The CIOC initially agreed to 
merge the Commission on Administration of Justice (Ombudsman) and the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights Bills while keeping the National Gender and 
Equality Commission Bill separate. However, this proposition failed because the Bills 
were withdrawn to allow MPs to understand the rationale of having all the three Bills 
passed separately.21  
 
68. The proposal to amend the Constitution is raising concern that could threaten the 
implementation process: The decision by the Executive to start proposing amendments 
to the Constitution has drawn criticism. Some argue that it is too early and inconsistent 
with public expectations to begin to amend the Constitution. They point out that the 
Cabinet should have waited for the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and 
give direction on unclear provisions.22 At the same time, there is fear that it sets a 
                                                 
20 ‘MPs protest nominations to key posts’ Daily Nation, 24 August 2011 
21 See ‘CIOC Agrees to Merge Bills in Deadline Rush’, Daily Nation, 9 August 2011 
22 Interview with a policy analyst, 14 September 2011 
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negative precedent that could invite those opposed to the Constitution to start 
proposing amendments through Parliament to suit sectarian interests. These are new 
challenges that require circumspect approach.  
Conclusion 
69. There is progress in the implementation of the Constitution. Critical laws have been 
passed and the Parliament met the constitutional deadline to pass the mandatory Bills. 
But the process leading to the passage of these Bills was hurried; there was insufficient 
time for the public to scrutinise them. Furthermore, the Executive bypassed the CIC in 
processing some of the Bills, even though the commission is meant to play a watchdog 
role in the implementation process. Vested interests and limited attention to the 
implementation process by everyone involved caused enormous delays in passing some 
of the Bills. Lack of adequate public scrutiny resulting from the speed with which the 
Bills were debated and passed has raised fears that the draft were faulty and that some 
unconstitutional provisions could have been sneaked into the laws through Parliament. 
 
70. The Constitution is a negotiated document. It is the result of a settlement negotiated by 
the two parties before the referendum. During the negotiations before the referendum, 
issues that were not clearly resolved are gradually resurfacing to slow down 
implementation. There is need for caution about the whole process to prevent a 
deepening of a crisis of where competing expectations cannot be practicably reconciled.  
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 3. REFORMS AND PREPAREDNESS FOR ELECTIONS  
Introduction 
71. Failure to effectively manage the 2007 elections triggered the post-election violence, 
which had devastating consequences for Kenya.  Investigations by the Independent 
Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007 
(IREC/ Kriegler Commission) found, inter alia, that the country’s constitutional and 
legal framework relating to elections contained weaknesses and inconsistencies that 
limited the effectiveness of Kenya’s electoral system. The Commission underlined the 
need to thoroughly overhaul the electoral management process and the institutions on 
which it was anchored. The inquiry also found that the defunct Electoral Commission 
of Kenya lacked the necessary independence, capacity and functionality resulting from 
its organizational structure, composition and management systems. The investigation 
further indicted the political parties and the media, while noting ‘serious anomalies’ in 
the delimitation of constituencies.  
 
72. IREC recommended radical reforms in the electoral body. It also called for urgent 
executive, legislative and political measures to enable a newly reconstituted electoral 
body to perform its essential functions. Among such functions would be to initiate, 
popularise and sustain a national commitment to electoral integrity in Kenya. This 
would entail the adoption of a new voter registration system and relevant legal reforms.  
 
73. Following IREC’s recommendations, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was 
disbanded in 2008 and an Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) formed, 
with a fully functional secretariat and regional coordinators. The IIEC conducted new 
manual and electronic voter registration in 2010 and oversaw successful by-elections 
and the August 2010 referendum. These achievements and pertinent legal reforms 
began to restore public trust in the electoral management process in Kenya. 
 
74. This section of the report examines some of the reforms initiated to support the 
electoral process. The discussion generally centres on how prepared the country is for 
another General Election.  
 
Electoral Reforms in the New Constitutional Dispensation  
75. Since the promulgation of the Constitution, several laws have been passed to support 
the electoral process. A close review of the process of passing these laws reveals that 
short-term interests informed the drafting of the laws and how political leaders 
amended them. For instance, the Political Parties Bill was introduced to streamline the 
operations of political parties, instil political party discipline, provide guidelines on 
party loyalty and arrest the ‘party hopping’ that characterises pre-election periods, 
when candidates switch to multiple parties in search of nomination. The Bill was 
amended to exclude strict control over, among others, party hopping and the formation 
of alliances.  
 
76. The enacted law, nonetheless, contains important provisions to streamline political 
party operations as provided for under Article 91 of the Constitution. Although the 
spirit of the law centred around strengthening political parties as institutions, the 
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debate in Parliament focused on party coalitions, particularly the question of whether 
to allow parties to form coalitions and mergers before or after the elections. The Bill 
was eventually amended to allow for alliances/coalitions before and after elections.  
 
77. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act: Controversy over the 
composition and control of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission is 
probably the main challenge that has so far confronted the discussions on electoral 
reforms. The issue of control of a new electoral Commission has been cited as a 
significant explanation for delays in enacting the requisite legislation.23 The law setting 
up the Commission, a successor to the Interim Independent Electoral Commission and 
the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission should have been enacted 
soon after the promulgation of the Constitution in August 2010.24 Politicians are 
particularly interested in how the delimitation of boundaries and distribution of 80 
new constituencies will be done. The boundaries issue needs to be flagged early as one 
of the main potential triggers of violence.   
 
78. The Bill setting up the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was 
passed on 31 May 2011 and the President assented to it on 5 July 2011. The IEBC, 
established under Article 88 of the Constitution, is responsible for conducting or 
supervising referenda and elections and is charged with determining the boundaries of 
80 new constituencies. This is a contentious issue because the Interim Independent 
Boundaries Review Commission (the Ligale Commission) wound up without 
concluding its assignment.25  The tension this issue is likely to generate in future was 
apparent when the Bill was brought to the House for debate. Even though the Bill was 
passed, it was not before a record 70 amendments were made to it.  
 
79. The short-listing of candidates to serve as IEBC commissioners has led to a controversy 
around the criteria used to select them. Some politicians have expressed concern with 
the criteria, claiming that it locked out some commissioners serving in the Interim 
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC). Some political leaders argue that these IIEC 
Commissioners had proved their worth by conducting a free and fair referendum in 
2011 and several by-elections. But those who support the short-listed applicants are of 
the view that the Selection Panel should be left alone to finish its work.  
 
80. The amendments and the emergent issues are a sign of suspicions between the 
coalition partners. Some legislators wanted the new Commission to adopt the report of 
the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC) as the reference 
document for delimiting 80 constituencies. Others preferred the report – that was 
rejected. These polarities point to the sensitivity of the process of creating new 
constituencies and therefore the need for caution and objectivity in delimiting new 
boundaries.  
 
                                                 
23 See ‘CIOC Wants Government Printer Punished’, The Standard, 21 July 2011 
24  See ‘Wako accused of stalling new laws’, The Standard, 29 June 2011 
25 The CIC had written the protest letters on two different dates, i.e on 28 May 2011 and 24 June 2011 
according to ‘Wako accused of stalling new laws’, The Standard, 29 June 2011. The protest letter was copied to 
the Justice Minister, Kenya Law Reform Commission and the Parliamentary CIOC. See article on KBC online 
website at http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=71152.  
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81. These vested interests could taint the IEBC even before it is formed. Politicisation of 
the process of establishing a new IEBC will certainly undermine its autonomy as well as 
the legitimacy of the commissioners. In turn, this will make it difficult for the 
Commission to perform its functions especially complicate the demarcation of the 80 
new constituencies. In other words, the establishment of a new IEBC is the most 
important point of the journey away from the post-election violence legacy thus far.  
Furthermore, the conduct of elections under the new Constitution and by a newly 
created independent elections body is a major turning point in Kenya after the post-
election violence. The elections, if conducted well, could deliver a new dawn and transit 
Kenya to a democracy. But if poorly conducted and politicised through interference and 
influence in composing the electoral body, then the country risks losing the 
investments made in ensuring sustainable peace and political stability. 
 
The New Constitution and Preparedness for the Next General Election 
82. As the date for the next General Election approaches,  there should be recognition of 
the preparations that must be put in place to ensure a smooth electoral process and 
proactively manage possible triggers of violence. There is an urgent need to examine 
preparedness of the logistical and institutional framework to conduct successful 
elections in the 47 counties and to check whether measures are in place to manage 
elections competently and in a manner that inspires public confidence in the electoral 
process. With the memories of 2007 still fresh in the minds of Kenyans, an effective 
and efficient electoral disputes resolution mechanism must be established. Moreover, 
uncertainties about the date of the next General Election – whether August or 
December 2012 or even on any other date – point to the need for adequate preparation 
in advance. 
 
83. With a legal framework that is still taking shape, issues around violence during 
elections are of concern. Besides, in the past Kenyans have elected only three 
representatives (President, Member of Parliament, and Councillor) at every General 
Election. Under the new law, they will be required to elect candidates for at least six 
positions. In addition to other factors such as the weather conditions, the next election 
has the potential of turning into a logistical nightmare, with serious implications for 
the entire electoral process. 
 
84. Since it was constituted in 2008, the IIEC has conducted elections with success and 
enjoyed widespread public approval. However, there is concern that these 
achievements do not match up to the organisational demands and public intolerance 
for error that the next General Election will entail. Besides, concerns about the 
composition of the independent electoral body, particularly the integrity of the process 
of recruitment of commissioners, is a significant hurdle that must be overcome to 
restore public confidence not only in the electoral commission, but the entire electoral 
process, including the integrity of the results. 
 
85. To succeed in meeting the high standards of efficiency and transparency that Kenyans 
now expect of the electoral body, the country needs to surmount three challenges 
related to past elections: (i) establish a conducive environment for a successful 
electoral process; (ii) manage the next General Election reliably, competently and in a 
manner that inspires public trust in the electoral process; and (iii) proactively manage 
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pre-election violence triggers and settle election disputes in a fair manner and 
expeditiously.  
Setting a Conducive Environment for a Successful Electoral Process 
86. With the legacy of 2007 disputed elections fresh in the memory of many, it is important 
to determine the extent to which Kenya has addressed the institutional and legal 
challenges that precipitated the crisis. Thus, there is a need to examine the measures to 
put in place to ensure that the next General Election is a peaceful, free and fair. In this 
regard, the existing legal framework and behaviour of various actors should be seen to 
establish a pre-election environment in which it is possible to prepare for and conduct 
genuine elections.  
 
87. Free expression of suffrage by voters and candidates should be manifest in whether or 
not the electoral system establishes a fair basis for electoral competition. Laws and 
practices should also effectively regulate the media and guarantee equitable access to 
state and non-state media. More vigilance is needed to ensure that electoral laws and 
practices guarantee freedoms of assembly, organisation and association, electoral 
participation, and that they ensure citizens receive adequate civic and voter education. 
In addition, measures must be in place to monitor the conduct of political parties as 
responsible actors in the electoral process, and to ensure early warning and early 
response mechanisms to mitigate election-related violence. Consultative mechanism 
between the IEBC and the political parties should be established quite early. 
 
88. A careful look at the period between 2008 and the reporting period indicates that the 
context for holding elections in Kenya  presents mixed signals. Despite a successful 
constitutional reform process, continuing legal reforms and the prospect of a new 
electoral Commission, there are several gaps in this journey to a free and fair election. 
Table 4 below contains the key challenges that are still outstanding and possible 
solutions. 
 
Table 4: Towards a more conducive electoral environment 
 
Challenges Recommendations 
1. Continuing uncertainty over gender 
quotas 
• Speedily resolve the doubts over the system through 
a suitable constitutional amendment. 
2. FPTP system raises the possibility of a 
close zero-sum electoral contest with 
distortion effects 
• Strengthen early response mechanisms 
• Conduct civic education on the electoral system 
3. Incomplete legal reforms • Hasten the promulgation of regulations under the 
relevant laws. 
4. Ineffective media regulation and 
inequitable access to the media 
• Conduct an audit of media ownership in Kenya. 
• Promulgate equitable access regulations under the 
Elections Act, 2011 and enforce them 
5. Continuing violations of basic political 
freedoms 
• Speed up police reforms and judicial reforms 
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Challenges Recommendations 
6. Uncoordinated, under-funded, 
unstructured and unfocussed civic 
education 
• Agree on the minimum content for an election-
centred voter education programme within the context 
of an inclusive national civic education programme 
7. Weak political parties and ineffective 
political party regulation 
• Promulgate comprehensive regulations under the 
Political Parties Act, 2011 
8. Weak early response mechanisms • Speed up police reforms 
• Strengthen peace committees 
9. Inadequate facilitation of electoral 
observation 
• Develop a Code of Conduct for Election Observers 
that includes adequate facilitation for electoral observation 
 
Manage Elections Competently and Inspire Public Trust in the Electoral 
Process 
89. The failure of the 2007 General Election seriously eroded public trust in elections in 
Kenya. Hence, the process of appointment of Commissioners for the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission and their stewardship of the electoral process 
from the date of appointment has serious implications for the restoration of public 
confidence.26 The country needs to establish an independent electoral Commission that 
commands the respect, faith and confidence of Kenyans to avoid a crisis of confidence 
such as that which triggered the 2007 crisis.  
90. When asked during the survey what two things should be done before the next General 
Election to ensure free and fair elections, 49 per cent of the respondents said there 
should be transparency in the electoral process while 38 per cent would like to see an 
efficient electoral management body established. 
                                                 
26 ‘Kenya polls team list sparks heated debate,’ Daily Nation, 18 September 2011 
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Figure 20: What two things should be done before the next General Election to ensure they 
are free and fair? 
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91. Given the public expectations of high standards, it is important to ensure, from the 
outset, that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission is perceived as 
independent fair, competent and impartial. In addition, the legal and institutional 
framework for the Electoral Commission should be adequate, and the electoral 
commission should demonstrate its capacity to exercise effective control of the 
electoral process, including a comprehensive, accurate and current register of voters. 
The demarcation of constituencies should be transparent and fair, particularly with the 
introduction of 80 new units. Oversight measures must be put in place early enough to 
ensure that during the elections, the counting, transmission, collation and 
announcement of election results is perceived to be free of fraud and manipulation. 
 
92. A new legal and institutional framework for an Independent Electoral Commission is 
being put in place amidst concerns about the results of reconstituting it, especially the 
preservation of institutional memory. Table 5 below contains the continuing challenges 
that will need further attention. 
 
Table 5: Towards better Election Management Body readiness and competence 
 
Challenges Recommendations 
1. Uncertainty over the election date 
for the next elections 
• Set down the case filed by the CIC and determine it in 
good time to clarify election date issue. 
2. Continuing weakness of enforcement 
action in respect to electoral offences 
• Speed up fundamental police reforms 
• Coordinate with the Director of Public Prosecutions to 
pay adequate attention to electoral offences 
• Firmly use enforcement powers under the Elections 
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Challenges Recommendations 
Act, 2011 
3. Continuing bottlenecks against the 
maintenance of an accurate and 
current register 
• Integrate voter registration with the Integrated 
Population Registration System (IPRS) in a way that 
allows the sharing of registration data while protecting 
the integrity of the register. 
4. Incomplete constituency delimitation 
process in a charged electoral 
environment 
• Speed up constituency delimitation after the 
constitution of IEBC. 
5. Uncertainty over the appointment of 
the Chairperson and members of the 
IEBC 
• Monitor the appointment process for IEBC for 
compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. 
6. Uncertainty over the ability of the 
EMB to put in place a fool-proof 
system for counting of votes and 
results transmission 
• Establish a computer-based system for transmission of 
results. 
• Choose electronic voting solution carefully to ensure 
the availability of an audit trail in the event of system 
failure. 
• EMB should provide full transparency on a web-based 
platform for elections results up to polling station 
level. 
 Settle Electoral Disputes Efficiently and Effectively 
93. It is widely believed that the 2007 General Election would probably not have ended the 
way it did had the electoral commission and the Judiciary enjoyed public trust and had 
there been an effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism. It is therefore 
important to also ensure that the electoral management body has an effective and 
impartial mechanism to manage pre- and post-election disputes. Apparent lack of 
clarity about the respective roles of the Political Parties Dispute Tribunal, the IEBC and 
the High Court with regard to the management of disputes touching on political parties 
and electoral disputes needs to be addressed early to streamline mandates for timely 
and clear institutional responses.    
 
94. Although election petition determination after 2007 has inspired confidence in the 
courts and judicial reforms will further bolster this confidence, there are still concerns 
relating to case flow management and the fruits of the vetting process that is yet to 
commence. Table 6 below contains the key outstanding challenges and recommended 
solutions. 
 
Table 6: Towards improved electoral dispute resolution 
 
Challenges Recommendations 
1. Incomplete legal reforms on electoral 
dispute resolution. 
• Finalise the making of rules under the applicable 
laws. 
2. Uncertainty over the ability of the EMB • Courts should defer to the Political Parties Disputes 
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Challenges Recommendations 
to effectively and efficiently handle 
pre-election disputes. 
Tribunal and the IEBC dispute settlement system in 
the first instance and only interfere in cases of 
manifest injustice. 
• Provide technical assistance to the new EMB on the 
settlement of pre-election disputes. 
3. Uncertainty over the ability of the 
judiciary to hear and determine 
election disputes efficiently and fairly. 
• Speed up on-going judicial reforms. 
• Consider appointing a special bench of judges to hear 
and determine election-related disputes from the 
nominations period to a year after the elections in 
order to accord election petitions the priority that 
the law requires. 
Conclusion 
95. Several laws have been enacted to improve the electoral process. Be that as it may, the 
establishment of an independent electoral Commission will be an important milestone 
in Kenya’s reform agenda. Politicisation of the process of establishing this new body 
will lay a foundation for future conflicts over the decision on important election issues 
by this body.  It is imperative to insulate the recruitment process from partisan and 
narrow interests. 
 
96. An important aspect of preparations for the election is the institutional capacity of the 
body that will manage the elections. It is true that laws are important. But laws on their 
own without the agency to enforce and impose sanctions on those who breach them 
mean little, especially in a country where electoral violence, because of impunity, 
appears to have transformed into a culture. Giving the new body adequate powers to 
punish those who breach the law is important. 
 
97. The new electoral body can midwife the country to a democratic dispensation or fail it 
altogether. Failure to effectively and efficiently manage the electoral process would 
certainly fail the country. It is important, therefore, for much more attention to be paid 
to ‘institutional preparedness’ rather than the date of elections. It is possible to go for 
an election on a particular date only to realise that the country is not politically and 
institutionally – or even technically – prepared to conduct the election. Whatever date 
the country opts for, legal, political and institutional preparations must be finalised in 
advance. 
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4. THE LEGACY OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE: THE ICC ADD IDPs 
 
Introduction 
98. The KNDR agreement recommended the establishment of a commission of inquiry to 
investigate the causes of the post-election violence. The Commission of Inquiry into the 
Post-Election Violence (CIPEV/Waki Commission) was established in line with this 
recommendation. CIPEV recommended, inter alia, the setting up of a Special Tribunal 
for Kenya within a given time frame to investigate and prosecute suspected 
perpetrators of crimes committed during the crisis period. It also recommended 
handing over the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the government 
failed to set up the Tribunal.  
 
99. On two occasions in 2009, the government failed to obtain enough support in 
Parliament for passing laws to set up the Tribunal. Some political leaders preferred the 
matter to be handed over to the ICC, if not ignored altogether. There was limited 
support for a local Tribunal. Following this development, and in line with CIPEV 
recommendations, in March 2010, the ICC Chief Prosecutor sought permission from 
the Pre-Trial Chamber II to open an investigation into the situation in Kenya. The 
Chamber granted permission.27 On 15 December 2010, the ICC Prosecutor named six 
persons suspected to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes committed during the 
post-election violence (PEV). On 8 March 2011, the ICC issued summonses for the 
suspects to appear before the court. On 7 and 8 April 2011, the six suspects made their 
initial appearance before the ICC. 
 
100. This section of the report looks at the progress of the ICC investigation of the Kenya 
situation this far. It also looks at public perceptions of the role of the court in fighting 
impunity in Kenya.  
 
Summary of findings 
• Government unsuccessfully challenges admissibility of the case before the ICC 
• The issue of political responsibility dominates confirmation of charges 
hearings 
• Covert discourses continue to politicise the ICC process in Kenya 
• Public support for the ICC remains high, but lower than before naming of 
suspects  
• Concern that the ICC Chief Prosecutor may fail to adduce adequate evidence 
due to lack of government cooperation 
• Covert intimidation of witnesses characterised by ostracism of ‘suspected’ 
witnesses and the language of ‘betrayal of the community’ 
• Majority believe the ICC investigations are unlikely to trigger violence  
 
                                                 
27 See previous South reports at www.south.co.ke and www.dialoguekenya.org 
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Progress of the Investigation 
101. Since the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued summonses to appear on 8 March, 2011, a 
number of events have taken place. By the end of September 2011, the ICC had started 
the confirmation of charges hearings against three of the suspects from ODM side 
while hearings for the three from the PNU side were expected to end on 5 October 
2011. The figure below shows the progress made in this respect: 
 
Table 7: Milestones in the ICC investigation  
 
Reactions to the ICC Investigations  
102. Government efforts to withdraw from the ICC: From the time the Pre-Trial Chamber 
II granted the Prosecutor permission to investigate the Kenya situation, the 
government began to make diplomatic attempts to defer the Kenya case. In March 
2011, the government hired lawyers and filed an application challenging the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over the cases. The government argued that with a new Constitution and 
reformed Judiciary, it was now able and willing to conduct trials against the six 
suspects locally.28 However, in May 2011 the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber II 
unanimously dismissed the application with a ruling that ‘in the absence of information 
which substantiates the Government of Kenya’s challenge that there are ongoing 
investigations against the suspects, the cases are admissible’.29 By the time the ICC 
investigation was started, there was no evidence found that the police had been 
investigating any of the six individuals mentioned by the Prosecutor. In June, the 
                                                 
28 Application on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, 
No. ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11, 31 March 2011 
29 Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, CC-01/09-01/11-101, 30 May 2011 
              8-Sep-11 Pre-Trial Chamber concludes 
confirmation of Charges 
hearing for Case 1 
            1-Sep-11 The confirmation of charges hearing of Case 
1 begins    
          30-Aug-11 Appeals Chamber dismisses Kenya appeal to have ICC 
cases stopped 
        22-Aug-11 Poll: Sections of Kenyan public have reduced their support for the ICC  
process    
      4-Aug-11 The Prosecution offers more details of its Case 1- William Ruto, Henry Kosgey and 
Joshua Sang   
  
    25-Jul-11 The Government of Kenya unsuccessfully challenges the admissibility of the cases    
  
  31-Mar-11  Kenyan government files an application challenging the ICC’s jurisdiction over the cases. Pre-Trial Chamber II 
dismisses the challenge to admissibility 
8-Mar-11   
Pre-Trial Chamber II issues the summonses to appear for six individuals 
47  
  
 
Government appealed against that decision, arguing that the judges had erred in their 
ruling.30 On 30 August, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeal by a majority.31 
103. The ICC ruling that the Kenya government failed to demonstrate any evidence that 
investigations on any of the six suspects were ongoing or that a Kenyan prosecutor had 
opened any cases against the suspects resonated strongly with public perceptions in 
favour of the ICC intervention. When asked whether they believed the government 
could conduct genuine investigations and prosecutions of the six suspects, 58 per cent 
of respondents did not believe so. Only 26 per cent said that they thought the 
government can do conduct investigations and prosecute the six suspects.  
Figure 21: Do you think the government can conduct genuine investigations and 
prosecutions of the six suspects? 
 
104. A regional analysis shows that the perception of government’s inability to carry out 
genuine investigations is widely shared in all regions, even in those regions where 
suspects hail from. However, more people in the former Central Province than any 
other area express faith in government willingness to conduct investigations and trials. 
Similarly, regions in favour of the ICC investigation, such as North Eastern and 
Nyanza, show high levels of disbelief.    
 
                                                 
30 Appeal of the Government of Kenya against the 'Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2) (b) of the Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-104. 
31 Decision on the Presiding Judge of the Appeals Chamber in the appeal of the Government of Kenya against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II entitled ‘Decision on the Request for Assistance Submitted on Behalf of 
the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 93(10) of the Statute and Rule 194 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence’ 
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Table 8: Do you think the Kenya government can conduct genuine investigations 
against the 6 ICC suspects? 
 
Do you think the Kenya government can conduct genuine investigations and prosecutions of the 6 
suspects named by Ocampo/ICC? (by region) 
  Yes No No response Don't know 
Central 38% 52% 3% 7% 
Coast 11% 62% 2% 26% 
Eastern 31% 55% 3% 11% 
Nairobi 31% 64% 0% 5% 
North Eastern 18% 73% 2% 7% 
Nyanza 17% 67% 1% 15% 
Rift Valley 27% 53% 3% 17% 
Western 18% 57% 3% 21% 
 
105. The ICC intervention tends to deepen divisions within government. The proceedings at 
the confirmation of charges hearings at the ICC and debate on the matter of political 
responsibility for violence have deepened fissures within the coalition government.  
The hearings have re-established the cold relations that characterised the early days of 
the coalition government; they have introduced new perspectives about levels of 
culpability of the suspects and reinforced the view that the list of suspects by the ICC 
was ‘incomplete’ because it does not comprise leaders from some of the ethnic 
communities.
32
 These discourses have continued to imbue the investigation with 
political undertones, which overshadow debate about the question of impunity. In 
effect, focus on ‘who else should be investigated’ obscures the question of why 
investigations are taking place and reinforces notions of victimisation for political 
ends.33  
 
106. The government is perceived as being complicit in impunity: The low public 
confidence in the ability of government to conduct investigations suggests that people 
are still hesitant to trust new institutions, including those created under the new 
Constitution.34 Indeed, 33 per cent of the respondents said they did not believe the 
government can effectively prosecute the ICC suspects because they cannot trust the 
Judiciary. Another 22 per cent said they believe that some of the suspects are so 
powerful in government that they would mire investigations. The largest number (45%) 
of sceptics thinks the government is corrupt and therefore likely to be compromised. 
These findings suggest that efforts taken to address the underlying causes of violence 
have not had meaningful impact to change perceptions about the government and its 
institutions.  
                                                 
32 ‘Cabinet meets over ICC hearings’, The Standard 4 Sept 2011  
33 http://www.icckenya.org/2011/09/icc-case-not-viewed-as-against-ruto-kosgey-and-sang-but-against-the-
kalenjin/  
34 Interview with a university lecturer, 2 September 2011 
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Figure 22: If No (government cannot conduct genuine investigations), why? 
 
107. People are generally happy with the ICC interventions: Perceptions of lack of 
government commitment to fight impunity sustains public support for the ICC. A 
significant majority, 65 per cent of the respondents, are happy that the ICC is pursuing 
the six suspects. 
 
Figure 23: Are you happy or unhappy that the ICC is pursuing the six suspects? (By total) 
65%
31%
4%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Happy
Not Happy
Don't Care
Are you happy or unhappy that The Hague/the ICC is pursuing the six 
suspects of the post election violence (PEV)? (by Total)
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Table 9: Are you happy or unhappy that the ICC is pursuing the six ICC suspects 
(by region) 
 
 
 
108. Those who are happy with the ICC perceive it as the only means to get justice for 
victims of the post-election violence and end impunity in Kenya. Lack of movement in 
prosecuting powerful persons as well as low-level perpetrators since the post-election 
violence suggests that the ICC continues to capture the public imagination about what 
should be done to fight impunity at all levels: 
 
Table 10: If happy; why? 
 
 
Total Central Coast Eastern Nairobi 
North 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley 
Western 
It will end impunity 29% 13% 19% 35% 30% 22% 38% 30% 34% 
We do not trust 
Kenya courts 
10% 11% 4% 9% 9% 10% 4% 11% 22% 
To get justice for the 
PEV victims 
44% 46% 52% 36% 48% 53% 43% 47% 35% 
It will prevent future 
violence 
16% 27% 24% 18% 11% 14% 14% 12% 10% 
To know the truth 
about the PEV 
0% 2% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
RTA 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
109. As noted above, 31 per cent of respondents across Kenya are not happy with the ICC is 
trying the six suspects. Of these, 37 per cent agree with the government position that 
they should be tried by local courts. Over 20 per cent of those unhappy with the ICC 
think those charged are not the real suspects. One respondent, for instance, noted that 
Are you happy or unhappy that The Hague/the ICC is pursuing the six suspects of the post election 
violence (PEV)? (by region) 
  
Very happy 
Somewhat 
happy 
Not very 
happy 
Not happy at all Don't care 
Central 47% 17% 9% 24% 3% 
Coast 57% 12% 11% 9% 12% 
Eastern 44% 18% 13% 22% 3% 
Nairobi 52% 12% 14% 21% 2% 
North Eastern 55% 17% 5% 19% 4% 
Nyanza 73% 10% 7% 6% 4% 
Rift Valley 39% 15% 15% 28% 3% 
Western 60% 11% 7% 19% 4% 
51  
  
 
‘those being charged are not the ones who killed people or burnt houses; the real 
suspects are with us here.’35 Of a similar opinion are those who think that the suspects 
are not the ones who hold the greatest responsibility for crimes committed during the 
post-election violence. There are those who think the suspects are ‘being sacrificed’ to 
protect others.36  The latter observation further informs the view by 9 per cent of the 
respondents that the ICC list is not complete.   
 
Figure 24: If unhappy, explain why 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110. Continued support for the ICC derives from public perceptions that the government is 
unlikely to conduct genuine investigations and prosecution of the suspects. About four 
years on, the public has not seen a major movement by the government to do so. As a 
result, a majority of respondents across the country are supportive of the prosecution 
of the six suspects at the ICC. However, some respondents, mostly from the Rift Valley, 
feel that the ICC has ‘targeted’ the suspects and their respective communities.37  
 
                                                 
35
 Interview with a displaced person in Eldoret, 9 July 2011  
36
 Interview with an elderly man in Eldoret, 10 July 2011 
 
37%
22%
18%
9%
6%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
They should have been tried using local courts
The 6 accused are not real suspects
Most of the perpetrators were not prosecuted
The ICC list is not complete
The ICC process is too slow
RTA
There is no evidence against the suspects
People have forgiven each other and reconciled
It might lead to violence in the country
No trust in ICC
If unhappy, please explain why? (by Total)
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Figure 25: How supportive or not supportive are you of the ICC efforts to prosecute the six 
ICC suspects? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111. A regional analysis shows that majority of respondents in all regions are supportive of 
the ICC investigation. Support is lowest in the Rift Valley and Central regions, where 
most of the suspects come from. 
 
Table 11: How supportive or not supportive are you of the ICC (by region) 
 
How supportive or not supportive are you of ICCs efforts to prosecute the six people named by Ocampo as 
PEV suspects? (by region) 
 Central Coast Eastern Nairobi N/Eastern Nyanza R/Valley Western 
 Supportive of the 
ICC 
65% 77% 66% 67% 76% 85% 59% 77% 
Not supportive of the 
ICC 
33% 16% 32% 30% 23% 11% 39% 22% 
RTA/DK/NR 3% 7% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 1% 
 
112. ICC is not politically manipulated: Allegations that the ICC process has been used to 
eliminate political rivals ahead of the next elections do not seem to enjoy widespread 
public support: a majority of respondents across the country are of the view that those 
supporting the ICC are doing so to get justice for the victims of violence or to protect 
some of the suspects rather than to eliminate political rivals. 
 
51%
18%
12%
16%
3%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Very supportive of the ICC
Somewhat supportive of the ICC
Not very supportive of the ICC
Not supportive at all of the ICC
RTA/DK/NR
How supportive or not supportive are you of ICCs efforts to prosecute 
the 6 people named by Ocampo as PEV suspects? (by Total)
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Table 12: Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 
Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
  Agree Disagree 
Those opposing The Hague/the ICC action are mainly trying to 
protect those who organised the PEV 
60% 40% 
Those supporting The Hague/ the ICC action   are mainly concerned 
with getting justice for victims of the PEV 
74% 26% 
Politicians supporting the Hague/the ICC action are mainly 
concerned with eliminating political opponents 
47% 53% 
113. Public support and confidence in the ICC process remains high, albeit lower than it 
was before the naming of suspects.  As noted in previous reports, public support for 
the ICC has remained high since CIPEV completed its report, but the support reduced 
dramatically after the naming of the suspects. The reduction may be attributed to the 
perception that the court failed to include all the perpetrators from regions which 
experienced violence, which implies failure to include leaders of other ethnic groups.38 
The claim that four of the six suspects hail from the Rift Valley39 has reinforced the 
perception of a political vendetta against the people of the region.40 
114. Majority of respondents remain confident that investigations and prosecution by the 
ICC will not trigger violence. Up to 65 per cent of the respondents believe violence is 
highly unlikely to occur as a result of any outcome at the ICC. This is an encouraging 
finding. However, unlike in previous reviews, more people are concerned that isolated 
incidents of violence are likely to occur if certain politicians are indicted. Only 23 per 
cent of respondents said they think violence is likely. This percentage is the highest 
recorded over the past three years. This suggests that something is going on at the 
community level, away from the glare of the media and the public eye. 
                                                 
38 Interview with a university lecturer in Moi University, 5 July 2011 
39 Interview with an elderly woman in Eldoret, 9 July 2011 
40 Interview with a young man in Eldoret, 4 July 2011 
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Figure 26: How likely do you think it is that ICC trials will produce violence? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115. The very few (13%) who think violence is likely to occur think the most likely site of 
such violence is the Rift Valley. They attribute their concern to a number of reasons: to 
express anger against those supporting the ICC, to show solidarity with the suspects, 
and impunity for lower level perpetrators. As noted in a previous review report, the 
prosecution of only high level perpetrators without any mechanism for the those who 
carried out the actual attacks risks reinforcing impunity among those who believe they 
are out of reach of the ICC. Other places deemed to be possible scenes of violence are 
those that experienced violence during the 2007 political crisis, including Nakuru, 
Naivasha, and Nairobi including Kibera, Kisumu and Kiambu.  
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Very Likely
Somewhat likely
Somewhat unlikely
Very unlikely
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If the ICC trials take place, how likely do you think it is to produce 
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Figure 27: If yes, why do you think violence will occur in this place? 
37%
35%
15%
5%
3%
2%
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To revenge against those supporting the ICC
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Because no action has been taken against perpetrators of pos
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NR
Tribalism
I don't know
Why do you think violence will occur in this place? (by Total)
 
 
116. Although only a small percentage of Kenyans think violence is likely to erupt as result 
of the ICC, these concerns should not be ignored because the conditions that caused 
the violence have not been addressed. In particular, the problem of illegal armed 
groups has not been resolved.    
56  
  
 
Figure 27: What is likely to happen if the ICC fails to prosecute any suspect for PEV? 
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People will lose trust in the ICC
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Violence is likely to erupt
There will be no justice
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NR/DK/RTA
What do you think is most likely to happen if the ICC fails to prosecute 
any suspects for post-election violence? (by Total)
 
 
117. The continued presence of illegal groups and their relationship with politicians as well 
as their self-sustaining strategies continue to create fear in some regions that these 
groups could re-emerge during the next elections. Of greater concern is the public 
perception that the police know who the members of these illegal groups are but have 
failed to deal with them. 
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Table 13: Thinking of illegal groups, do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
Thinking of illegal armed groups, do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  
Agree Disagree 
Don't 
know 
NR 
Illegal armed groups will re-emerge during the next general election 35% 43% 20% 1% 
Politicians finance illegal armed groups 67% 18% 14% 2% 
There are no illegal armed groups in this area 39% 45% 15% 1% 
The police know members of illegal armed groups 54% 23% 22% 1% 
The illegal armed groups provide security to the local people 19% 65% 15% 1% 
Witness Protection  
118. Since the start of investigations by the ICC, civil society organisations working directly 
with victims, or through human rights defenders, have expressed grave concerns about 
the security of witnesses. In response to these concerns, in 2010 the government made 
amendments to the Witness Protection Act of 2006 to create an independent and 
autonomous Witness Protection Unit. As noted in the July 2010 review report, the 
witness protection programme enjoyed little public trust and support because it was 
under the office of the Attorney General. Few Kenyans wanted to become witnesses.  
119. To address these concerns, in August 2011, the Witness Protection Agency was 
launched as an autonomous institution, with its own staffing and power to mobilise 
and disburse its funding independently.41 Despite these positive steps to improve 
witness protection, human rights defenders are concerned that the potential of the new 
agency could be undermined by lack of adequate funding. At its inception, it requested 
Ksh1.2 billion to support its operations but was only allocated Ksh300 million. A lot 
will need to be done to build public confidence in the programme. 
120. In contrast to this situation, a majority of respondents have confidence in the Witness 
Protection Programme run by the International Criminal Court. At least 65 per cent 
believe the ICC will protect witnesses who give evidence against the six suspects in the 
Kenya cases.  Conversely, 64 per cent think the government will not be able to protect 
its witnesses who give evidence. 
                                                 
41 Interview with officer working on witness protection in Nairobi, 17 September 2011 
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Table 14: Do you believe the ICC can protect its witnesses? 
 
Do you believe the ICC can/will protect its witnesses that will give evidence against the Ocampo 6? 
 
Total Central Coast Eastern Nairobi 
North 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley 
Western 
Yes 65% 64% 71% 66% 64% 73% 70% 55% 71% 
No 20% 26% 10% 19% 25% 26% 10% 25% 11% 
No response 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 0% 0% 
Don't know 15% 8% 17% 14% 9% 0% 18% 19% 18% 
 
Table 15: Do you believe the government will be able to protect its witnesses giving 
evidence? 
 
Do you believe the government will be able to protect its witnesses giving evidence? 
 
Total Central Coast Eastern Nairobi 
North 
Eastern 
Nyanza 
Rift 
Valley 
Western 
Yes 24% 40% 13% 31% 25% 14% 11% 24% 19% 
No 64% 55% 73% 55% 70% 83% 71% 63% 64% 
No response 1% 0% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 0% 
Don't know 11% 5% 12% 12% 4% 1% 16% 12% 18% 
121. The low level of confidence in the government programme may be attributed to the fact 
that some of the accused are senior government officials. The apparent determination 
by the government to save the six creates the impression that it is most unlikely to 
cooperate with the ICC or any other programme that could lead to prosecutions. 
Besides, reports on extra-judicial killings have shown that police hit squads have been 
able to trace and kill persons under civil society witness protection programmes.42 The 
fact that police officers are suspected perpetrators of the post-election violence means 
victims or their families might find it difficult to seek protection from the police. A 
regional analysis shows that respondents in the Rift Valley have the least level of 
confidence in witness protection programmes.  
122. Interestingly, only six per cent of the respondents think prosecution or other forms of 
accountability are the best way to stop future violence in Kenya. Majority recommend 
measures to ensure free and fair elections and to promote peace and reconciliation.   
                                                 
42 Alston Report 
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Figure 28: What is the most important way to prevent future violence in Kenya? 
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What would you say is the MOST IMPORTANT way to prevent future 
political violence in Kenya? (by Total)
 
123. This is a significant departure from earlier surveys, which showed a clear preference for 
prosecution. The sudden divergence of opinion calls for a careful investigation of what 
is going on that is making people fear prosecutions. In the past, the review reports 
observed that when people felt secure, they demanded prosecution; when they felt 
threatened, they preferred peaceful means of managing the threat. This data suggests 
that people are no longer so sure of their safety. Reports of covert intimidation of 
witnesses and ostracism of those perceived to betray their community could be 
indicative of deeper problems. Indeed, recent concerns about hacking of personal 
emails and leaking of the identity of witnesses suggest that people have reason to be 
afraid.   
 
The Challenge of Resettling IDPS  
124. The past review reports have outlined government efforts to deliver on the resettlement 
of IDPs. Through Operation Rudi Nyumbani, the government has closed nearly all IDP 
camps and facilitated the movement of displaced households to their former homes. 
With the help of humanitarian agencies, damaged homes and infrastructure have been 
reconstructed and many peace efforts initiated to restore harmonious relations. 
125. Despite these efforts, a number of displaced persons continue to live in camps. Most of 
the camps, however, were formed in new areas rather than places from which IDPs 
were displaced. Those in these camps are mostly the landless, whom the government 
has been helping to secure land because a majority of them pursue farming as a 
livelihood. 
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126. This section of the report discusses progress made towards finding lasting solutions to 
all IDPs. It observes that although KNDR envisaged the IDP problem would be 
resolved in the short term, it is a question that has become one of the most challenging 
for the coalition government.  
127. To begin, the Ministry of State for Special Programmes in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Lands have continued to look for land to resettle about 6,978 displaced 
households.43 According to the latest available update from the Ministry of Special 
Programmes, 5,396 acres of land have so far been acquired to settle 1,898 IDP families. 
This is the same number reported in the last review period. In early September, both 
ministries announced that they had set aside funds to resettle another 1,000 IDP 
households and were in the process of identifying land to purchase in different parts of 
the country.44 The ministries are also trying to identify land to settle forest evictees. 
128. There are perceptions of territorial owners and newcomers which have destabilised 
efforts to resettle IDPs: Communities which claim ‘outsiders’ should not be given land 
while local landless people remain landless have complicated the process of finding 
land to resettle IDPs. The claim that available land should revert to members of the 
community, which originally owned the land has created long delays and new 
dilemmas for government efforts to secure land. For instance, protests by the Maasai in 
Mau Narok have blocked the resettlement of IDPs on 2,264 acres of contested land, 
which has now been converted to an agricultural research station.45 
129. In the survey, majority of respondents do not support the policy of buying land for 
IDPs. Rather, they urge the government to facilitate their return to places from which 
they were displaced. The failure to return where they were displaced from has 
increased public concern about the legitimacy of claims of displacement. Many people 
think such IDPs are impostors, or ‘fake IDPs’ who claim to be displaced in order to 
benefit from assistance programmes. 
                                                 
43 Initially 6,802; more self-help groups considered for inclusion; interview with leader of IDPs, September 
2011 
44 ‘State to Settle 1000 IDPs’, The Standard, 5 September 2011 
45 Ministry of Special Programmes, Progress Report on IDP Resettlement as at 18 July 2011  
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Figure 29: What can the government do to address the problem of IDPs? 
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130. Others argue that purchasing land for IDPs only is discriminatory of other landless 
Kenyans because it suggests that one has to be displaced to be given land. The fact that 
a majority of the displaced are from one community has bred resentment among other 
communities and is fuelling resistance to their resettlement. To address this 
perception, the Ministry of Special Programmes allocated land to mixed groups of 
people in Trans Nzoia. Similarly, the contested land in Mau Narok could have settled 
people from mixed groups. Respondents were of the view that IDPs should be given 
funds to decide independently and subjectively where to settle. 
131. The MoSSP has continued to disburse ex-gratia payments to IDPs as follows: 
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Table 16:  Disbursement of Ksh10,000 and Ksh25,000 
 
S/NO.  PROVINCE  START-UP FUNDS (10,000/= 
PER HOUSEHOLD 
SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF 
HOUSES (25,000/= PER HOUSEHOLD 
1  Rift Valley  1,100,570,000.00 623,375,000.00 
2  Coast  11,580,000.00 4,100,000.00 
3  Eastern  2,880,000.00 - 
4  Central  102,850,000.00 79,150,000.00 
5  Nairobi  38,650,000.00 10,575,000.00 
6  Western  134,370,000.00 186,450,000.00 
7  Nyanza  226,690,000.00 41,050,000.00 
TOTAL  1,617,590,000.00 944,700,000.00 
Source: Ministry of Special Programmes, 18 July 2011 
132. The data on disbursements, like most available data on IDPs, is disaggregated only by 
administrative units, not by other factors such as gender, ethnicity, age, etc. It is, 
therefore, difficult to know who the beneficiaries are. Allegations of corruption and 
embezzlement of funds largely stem from lack of reliable data.   
Access to Relief and Assistance Funds 
133. Continued assistance is promoting dependency among IDPs: The MoSSP has 
continued to give food relief for those still living in camps. According to a government 
official in Nakuru, the continued assistance of IDPs has caused them to develop a 
dependency syndrome. “Some of them don’t want to work any more. They just want to 
be assisted by the government. They have learnt to paint a very desperate picture of 
their lives to attract help.”46 There are also concerns that IDPs are reluctant to find 
solutions because life in the camp is easy. They are reluctant to reinsert themselves into 
the harsh economic conditions characterised by high food and commodity prices. 
134. Difficulty to target integrated IDPs because of their invisibility: It is difficult to target 
and access displaced persons who are integrated within rural communities and urban 
areas because they are not as visible as those in camps. In some parts of the Rift Valley, 
failure to assist those integrated in the community has bred resentment against those 
who went to camps and received assistance. Focus on only those in camps, who happen 
to be from one ethnic community, has created a perception of government bias, and 
neglect of those who did not go to camps. For instance, the perception that Kalenjin 
victims of violence were not adequately assisted because all members of that 
community were stigmatised as perpetrators has created deep resentment against the 
government assistance programme.47 The perception of neglect of genuine victims has 
undermined the impact of peace-building efforts in many parts of the Rift Valley. 
135. The problem of exclusion of genuine IDPs from other communities is complex because 
                                                 
46 Interview with a government official in Nakuru, 2 July 2011 
47 FGD with 6 women in Burnt Forest, July 2011 
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a majority of those who are integrated did not register during the profiling exercises in 
2008. It is, therefore, important for the government, in collaboration with non-
governmental organisations, to seek ways to identify and target all IDPs to prevent the 
festering of resentment, which may feed into existing discourses of grievance and 
generate new fault lines of violence. There is need to have clear and feasible guidelines 
for identifying genuine IDPs. 
The National Policy on IDPs 
136. The Draft National Policy on IDPs, completed in early 2010, has been awaiting Cabinet 
approval for more than a year. The previous review report noted that the draft had 
been approved by a Cabinet sub-committee, with a few changes. The draft has not been 
brought before Parliament for debate. There is need for stakeholders working on IDP-
related issues to think of more robust and effective strategies to draw legislators’ 
interest to it in order to push it through the legislative process. 
137. The Parliamentary Select Committee on Resettlement of IDPs is in the process of 
completing its report, which should include a draft Bill on IDPs. The anticipated Bill 
will be based on the National Policy, itself derived from the Great Lakes Protocol on the 
Protection and Assistance to IDPs, and the African Union Convention on the Protection 
and Assistance of IDPs. 
138. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs visited Kenya for an eight-
day mission in September 2011 to familiarise himself with the humanitarian situation 
of IDPs as well as efforts by the government and civil society organisations to address 
their concerns. He also visited IDP camps. At the end of his mission, he noted the lack 
of reliable data as a significant challenge to addressing the problem of IDPs. He also 
called for a consideration of more effective durable solutions, in consultation with 
IDPs.  
Promoting Healing and Reconciliation  
139. Agenda 2 of the KNDR required the Principals to lead measures to promote 
reconciliation in regions affected by the violence. The government established the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission (NCIC) to spearhead peace and reconciliation efforts in the 
country. The government also initiated several initiatives such as Operation Ujirani 
Mwema and the revitalisation of District Peace Committees. Individual politicians, 
NGOs and religious organisations have also supported peace and reconciliation efforts.  
140. While the first two years of KNDR witnessed robust engagement with peace work, the 
perception of increasing stability gradually eroded the urgency of reconciliation. 
Funding also dwindled, compelling District Peace Committees to reduce the number of 
their activities. 
141. As has been noted in previous reports, the TJRC has lacked gravitas from its inception 
and has therefore not had much impact as hoped. It collected over 20,000 statements 
and held public hearings in all the provinces. In this review period, the TJRC got a six 
months extension of its term to finalise its report.48 The TJRC Commissioners and staff 
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 Interview senior staff at the TJRC Secretariat, Sept 20111 
64  
  
 
have worked hard, considering the financial and capacity constraints that encumbered 
the commission from the start. However, persistent lack of support from civil society, 
discomfort with its methodology49 and inadequate media coverage of the hearings 
means the commission has continued to perform below its optimum potential..  
142. In the survey, a majority of the respondents said lack of witness protection was the 
most important hindrance to participation in the truth commission. Interestingly, 23 
per cent had no reason at all for not participating. Similarly lack of awareness about the 
functioning of the TJRC prevented participation.  
 
Table 17: What do you think might prevent people from your community from 
giving their views? 
 
Lack of witness protection 34% They do not trust the TJRC 7% 
Nothing 23% Language barrier 1% 
Don’t Know 10% TJRC is not accessible 1% 
Lack of awareness on TJRC 10% RTA 1% 
No response 7% Language barrier 1% 
Fear that TJRC recommendations may 
not be implemented 
6% TJRC is not accessible 1% 
They do not trust the TJRC 7%   
143. While public apathy  on the issue of commissions, fears of reprisal or victimisation may 
hinder people from giving their views about social ills, it is notable that a majority of 
people feel that the coalition government has made relations between people better.  
                                                 
49
For instance, victims were hired as statement takers; interview with member of civil society  
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Figure 30:  Has the coalition government made relations between communities better or 
worse? 
 
Conclusion 
144. The ICC Chief Prosecutor has made progress in efforts to address the legacy of the 
post-election violence. However, there is no movement on holding the lower and 
middle level perpetrators accountable. Demand for domestic accountability for these 
crimes has been reducing in terms of attention. This raises the need to raise public 
awareness, particularly because the government’s commitment to hold people 
accountable for the post-election violence is an issue of concern. Attempts to delay, 
postpone or withdraw from the ICC investigation on legal grounds  are a 
demonstration of absence of this commitment.  
145. Failure to fight impunity, by establishing complementarity mechanisms for domestic 
accountability for international crimes, and lack of trust in government programmes, 
suggests that the causes of the post-election violence have not been addressed. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that a majority of Kenyans believe there will be no 
violence as result of the ICC investigation or during the next elections.    
146. Internally displaced persons have continued to be a sore reminder of the post-election 
violence, yet their existence in a state of homelessness evokes fundamental questions 
about the reasons they are unable to go back to places from which they were displaced. 
The presence of IDPs is also a reminder that reconciliation is taking a while to 
consolidate. A lot of efforts have been put into restoring peace and reconciliation in 
violence affected areas. However, it appears that such peace has not been deeply 
rooted, as fear of reprisal and mistrust pervade the society. Ethnic divisions may be 
compounded by the outcome of the ICC investigation, and implementation of 
devolution ahead of next. Public vigilance is therefore important to ensure peaceful co-
existence. 
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
147. Various conclusions have been raised in the preceding sections. This section reiterates 
some of these conclusions and recommendations. The discussion has noted that rising 
inflation and the depreciation of the Kenya Shilling constitute major economic 
challenges during the period under review. These problems will negatively impact on 
implementation of reforms and may slow growth not only in agriculture but in other 
important sectors of the economy as well. Indeed, slow economic growth, combined 
with rising unemployment and generally huge income inequalities constitute a 
combustible mix that can explode if there is no strong commitment to cushion the 
poor, adhere to the rule of law and demonstrate political resolve to stop impunity in all 
its forms and at all levels of the society. 
148. With regard to progress in implementation of the constitution, the findings show that 
critical laws have been passed. But the process used to pass these laws was hurried and 
lacked sufficient time for consultations with the public. In some instances, the 
Executive by-passed the CIC and published important laws. The findings also show 
that there is a tendency in which the older order and vested interests are reorganising 
to frustrate the making of laws. There is need for continued vigilance over the 
Constitution implementation process. 
149. Critical legal and institutional framework for implementing the Constitution have been 
put in place. But some of these institutions lack the capacity to help consolidate gains 
and achievements thus far. There is need thus to begin building capacity of these 
institutions as well as developing clear and coherent policy to support their work. 
Implementation of the Constitution is at a critical point; the next General Election will 
move the country through a democratic transition if the poll is well and effectively 
managed. But failure to manage the electoral process or to prevent partisan political 
considerations from influencing decisions about the elections can fail the country yet 
again. On the whole, the electoral process should aim at moving the country to a 
democratic order. Kenyans should demand good laws, credible institutions and critical 
reforms even before concluding the debate on the election date. 
150. The legacy of the post-election violence continues to manifest itself in two important 
ways: the ICC intervention and the IDP problem. Although the ICC has intervened and 
the confirmation of charges hearings are going on, the country must begin thinking 
about domestic accountability. The country must establish mechanisms to hold lower 
and middle level and other perpetrators accountable. Public awareness on 
complementarity must be built in earnest and before the next elections. 
 
 
